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This paper considers the simultaneous determination of residential density and the supply of
local versus remote retail services. Possible equilibrium development patterns either correspond
closely to what anti-sprawl activists describe as smart growth, or to its opposite. Equilibrium and
optimal patterns of development do not always coincide. When equilibrium and optimal patterns
of development diverge, optimal density is always discretely (as opposed to marginally) higher
than equilibrium density. This occurs in the absence of congestion externalities, and is due to a
free-rider problem and a coordination problem. The analysis indicates that a tax on large lots or a
subsidy for small lots may be welfare improving under certain conditions.
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R2, H0.1. Introduction
Pedestrian based neighborhoods in which people live on small lots at relatively high densities
and are able to walk to nearby stores are the grail of lobby groups opposed to urban sprawl.1
Conversely, neighborhoods where people live on large lots and drive for all of their daily errands
are anathema to these lobbies. To understand the economic forces that lead to one type of neigh-
borhood or the other, this paper develops a model in which the location of housing and retail
services are simultaneously determined, and investigates both equilibrium and optimal patterns
of retail and residential location.
Beyond its relevance to the ongoing debate over urban sprawl, this analysis is of interest for
three reasons. First, the preponderance of the existing theoretical literature on the structure of cities
is based on the Mills-Muth model of a monocentric city and its generalizations (e.g., Brueckner
(4) and Berliant and Fujita (2)). This model focuses on the cost of commuting to work as the
force behind patterns of residential development. However, according to the National Household
Transportation Survey (14), fewer than 30% of an average American’s daily trips are work related.
Thus, it is of interest to develop models which allow us to analyze the relationship between non-
work trips and patterns of residential land use. This is precisely what is undertaken here.
Second, there is preliminary empirical evidence for a development process in which neighbor-
hoods lock into either low or high density development patterns, but not into an intermediate
density. The analysis presented here suggests an explanation for this observation.
Finally, this paper helps to explain an apparent gap between anti-sprawl activists and urban
economists. Anti-sprawl activists are apt to describe ‘urban sprawl’ hyperbolically, e.g., "We drive
up and down the gruesome, tragic suburban boulevards of commerce, and we’re overwhelmed
at the fantastic, awesome, stupefying ugliness ..." (Kuntsler (12)). More prosaically, anti-sprawl
activists seem to think that the organization of many current urban landscapes is not slightly, or
marginally different from the optimum, they think it is fundamentally wrong. Urban economists
on the other hand, appear to be more sanguine and advocate marginal changes, like congestion
taxes and marginal cost pricing for infrastructure, e.g., Brueckner (3). The analysis in this paper
provides a basis for resolving this apparent conﬂict. More speciﬁcally, this paper provides a frame-
work in which we can identify the conditions under which fundamentally wrong development
patterns can and cannot emerge.
This paper considers the simultaneous determination of residential density and the supply of
local versus remote retail services. It takes as given the availability of a remote retail sector to
anyone willing bear the cost of driving to it, and considers the entry decision of a local retailer,
along with decision of immigrants to locate in a neighborhood on small or large lots. Large lots
provide utility to their owners, but serve to reduce the number of people in the neighborhood. The
local retailer (e.g., a small grocery store, cafe or bookstore) can be reached by foot by neighborhood
residents. The local retailer can only survive if it operates at a certain minimum scale, and this scale
can only be achieved if the neighborhood is occupied by residents who choose small lots.
1I am grateful for ﬁnancial support from SSHRC. I am also grateful to Simon Board, Jan Brueckner, Gilles Duranton,
William Strange, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussions.
1Possible equilibrium development patterns either correspond closely to what anti-sprawl activ-
ists describe as smart growth, or to its opposite. Equilibrium and optimal patterns of development
do not always coincide. When equilibrium and optimal patterns of development diverge, optimal
density is always discretely (as opposed to marginally) higher than equilibrium density. This oc-
cursintheabsenceofcongestionexternalities, andisduetoafree-riderproblemandacoordination
problem. The analysis indicates that a tax on large lots or a subsidy for small lots may be welfare
improving under certain conditions.
2. Related literature
The object of this analysis is to consider patterns of residential location and land consumption in a
model where retail location is simultaneously determined with decisions about residential location
and housing density. While this issue has not been addressed directly, a number of different
strands of literature are relevant.
A large literature investigates city structure when there are agglomeration externalities in
production, and ﬁrm and residential locations are endogenous. In this literature, it is possible
that ‘edge cities’, small subcenters on the periphery of a large center, arise in equilibrium. These
subcenters look much like the neighborhoods studied here, and coordination problems similar to
those described here can also arise in these models. These models differ from the one in this paper
in that they are principally interested in patterns of location for employers, and as a simplifying
assumption, they generally ﬁx lot sizes for urban residents. This literature is surveyed in Duranton
and Puga (7).
An exception is Helsley and Strange (10). Helsley and Strange (10) consider a model where
individuals travel to the city center in order to engage in social interactions whose value increases
with the number of other individuals present in the center. Since they allow residential location
and density to be endogenously determined, their model has many features in common with the
one considered here. Helsley and Strange (10), however, are interested in the provision of a public
good, ‘social interactions’, while I am interested in the provision of a private good, ‘retail services’.
In addition, my model is intended to explain the structure of a single neighborhood at the edge of
an existing city, while Helsley and Strange (10) are interested in explaining the structure of a whole
city.
There is also a literature on the formation of neighborhoods in an environment with endogen-
ous provision of local public goods, endogenous location of individuals, and endogenous land
consumption. This large literature is surveyed in Scotchmer (15). While the present analysis may
appear similar to the literature on local public goods, it actually considers the provision of a private
good, retail services, a problem which by deﬁnition is not addressed by the literature on local
public goods. In particular, since retail services are provided by the private sector there is no need
to investigate a tax regime for ﬁnancing these services, an important topic for the literature on local
public goods.
In Chapter 7 of their excellent book, Fujita and Thisse (8) survey the literature on the location of
retail ﬁrms with a view to understanding the forces that cause retail ﬁrms to agglomerate. To the
2extent that residential location is endogenized in these models, it is done under the assumption
of ﬁxed lot size. Thus, while the literature surveyed in Fujita and Thisse (8) teaches us about
the emergence of business districts, it does not allow an investigation of the relationship between
housing density and the organization of the retail services market. In another excellent book,
DiPasquale and Wheaton (6) describe patterns of retail and population location in greater Boston
and survey the theoretical literature. Like Fujita and Thisse (8), the review of theoretical literature
in DiPasquale and Wheaton (6) focuses on the implications of retail ﬁrm location for the location
decisions of other retail ﬁrms.
Perhaps the closest competitor to this paper is Berliant and Konishi (1). Berliant and Konishi (1)
rationalize the emergence of cities and systems of cities as trading centers. They consider a general
equilibrium model of market and residential location in an environment with a discrete set of pos-
sible residential locations, endogenous land consumption, and different technologies for transport
to ‘near’ and ‘far’ markets. By contrast, the current paper considers a partial equilibrium model of
the formation of neighborhoods on the edge of an existing city, and is interested in the implications
of a minimum scale requirement for retail ﬁrms on patterns of residential development.
Finally, in Turner (16) I analyze a model superﬁcially similar to the one considered here. In
particular, Turner (16) considers the implications of a taste for nearby public open space on the
resulting equilibrium and optimal organization of residential land. Given a taste for public open
space, residents impose a cost on their neighbors by depriving them of open space. With market
allocation of land, this cost is not priced and leads the competitive organization of residential land
to be denser than the optimum. The current paper addresses the opposite situation, one in which
neighborhood residents can beneﬁt from having an additional neighbor.
3. A retail and residential development game
I consider the development of a new residential neighborhood at the edge of an existing city. I
would like to understand the forces which determine whether this neighborhood is developed at
a high density with retail stores within walking distance of most residences, or at low density with
residents driving for all retail services.
To begin, consider a city that is in equilibrium until just before the analysis begins, at which
time local wages increase exogenously. Migration to the city occurs in response to this increase in
the local wage, and immigrants have the choice of a location in the neighborhood under study or
in some other city or neighborhood. I consider new development that occurs in a neighborhood at
the city’s edge to house the new arrivals.
For integer N > 0, let Y = {1,...,2N} denote the set of available parcels of land and y ∈ Y a
particular parcel. Each location is owned by a landlord, each of whom owns exactly one parcel.
Index landlords by y ∈ Y where a landlord’s name also gives the name of his parcel. Let the set
of potential immigrants be I = {1,...,M} with M > 2N. Let i index this set. Potential immigrants
must choose between locating in the area described by Y or another location θ, implicitly some
other city or neighborhood. If immigrants choose to locate in Y they must occupy at least one
parcel, but may choose to occupy two parcels. More formally, immigrant i’s choice of location, yi,
3is a set {y, y0} if he chooses a double lot, a singleton {y} if he chooses a single lot, and θ if he
chooses the alternate city. Let i(y) denote the immigrant(s) occupying parcel y, with i(y) = φ if y is
unoccupied. Let X denote a location proﬁle, the collection of all occupied locations in Y, and X−i
the set of locations in Y occupied by all immigrants excluding i.
Each landlord chooses a non-negative price for his land, py. If no immigrant chooses a land-
lord’s location then the landlord receives the prevailing price in the best non-residential land use.
To lighten notation, normalize this price to zero. Let P = {p1,..., p2N} denote a choice of price for
all landlords, and P−y = P/py , a choice of price for all landlords but y.
All immigrants pay whatever price is associated with their choice of lot and all immigrants
commute into the old city to work for wage w ∈ R++. Immigrants are averse to sharing a location,
and if two immigrants occupy the same parcel they receive a large negative payoff. Immigrants
who choose location θ get reservation utility level uθ ∈ R++. Immigrants have a taste for large lots
and receive a utility bonus δ ∈ R++ if they occupy two parcels rather than one. This utility bonus
may be interpreted in two ways. First, that immigrants derive utility directly from having more
land. Alternately, alarger lot allowsimmigrants to substituteaway fromcapital in theirproduction
of housing and increases utility indirectly through this channel. To simplify the analysis there is
no utility bonus from additional parcels beyond two.
All immigrants consume one unit of retail services. Retail services are always available from a
remote retailer for a cost tD ∈ R++ which is the sum of the cost of driving to the remote retailer
and the price of remote retail services. Retail services may also be available locally at a cost tW + q,
where tW ∈ R++ is the parcel invariant cost of walking to the local retailer and q ∈ R++ is the unit
price of retail services at this local retailer. Conditional on choosing a lot in Y and on the presence
of a local retailer, an immigrant must choose whether to walk or drive to purchase retail services.
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w − (pyi + py0
i) + δ − tD if i chooses a double lot and driving
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i) + δ − (tW + q) if i chooses a double lot and walking
w − pyi − tD if i chooses a single lot and driving
w − pyi − (tW + q) if i chooses a single lot and walking
−∞ if immigrants purchase more than 2N parcels
uθ if yi = θ.
Note that if immigrants purchase more than 2N parcels, at least two immigrants will share a parcel.
Therefore, the effect of assigning an inﬁnite penalty to proﬁles where immigrants occupy more
than 2N parcels is to prohibit equilibria where immigrants share a parcel.
If a local retailer locates in the neighborhood, he pays a ﬁxed cost of F and no marginal cost.
Thus, conditional on entry, proﬁts for the local retailer are π = nq− F, where n denotes the number
of immigrants in the neighborhood. If the local retailer does not enter his proﬁts are zero. Formally,
an action for the local retailer is E ∈ {Enter, Not}. In order for the problem to be non-trivial,
assume that tW +q < tD, so that immigrants always choose to shop locally if a retailer enters. Also
assume that 2Nq > F > Nq, so that the local retailer is proﬁtable if and only if some portion of Y
is occupied by immigrants on single lots.
4To simplify the exposition the local retailer does not consume land. This is consistent with the
presence in each neighborhood of parcels suitable for retail development but not for residential
development, e.g., parcels near a busy street corner or railroad tracks. With this said, relieving
retailers from purchasing land is a simplifying assumption made to facilitate welfare comparisons
between neighborhoods with and without a local retailer. Requiring that a local retailer purchase
land does not qualitatively change my results.
The local retailer is assumed to charge an the exogenously determined unit price, q, rather than
choosing a price to maximize proﬁts. This assumption eliminates the need for a pricing game.
Since equilibria of such games depend sensitively on assumptions about market structure and the
possibility of entry (Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green (13)), endogenizing q would lead to a model
in which results depend sensitively on assumptions made about the monopolistic pricing game.
For my purpose, what is important is how much rent the monopoly local retailer is able to extract
from each immigrant. Leaving q exogenous permits comparative statics on this price.
To complete the model it remains to describe the timing of moves and the operation of the land
market. The market for residential land operates in three stages. First, all landlords simultaneously
choose prices. Second, the local retailer and all immigrants simultaneously decide whether or not
to locate in Y, and all immigrants simultaneously choose their lots and pay for the component
parcels. In the third stage, immigrants decide whether to walk to the local retailer or drive to the
remote retailer.2
All agents are restricted to choose pure strategies. A strategy for a landlord is a mapping from
the set of price proﬁles into the set of non-negative real numbers. That is, Sy(P−y) = py. A strategy
for an immigrant is a mapping from an observed price and location proﬁle into the set of possible
lots, i.e., Si(P,X−i,E) ∈ {Y × Y}
S
{θ}. Since tW + q < tD, immigrants always purchase retail
services from the local retailer if he enters. A strategy for the local retailer is a mapping from
observed price and location proﬁles into {Enter, Not}, i.e., E = SR(P,X) ∈ {Enter, Not}. Let
(P∗,X∗,E∗) denote a subgame perfect equilibrium choice of prices, lots, and entry. Landlords who
fail to attract an immigrant are assumed to choose price zero in any equilibrium. This assumption
replaces an implied fourth stage of the game in which landlords rent their land to a class of residual
users.
4. Equilibrium patterns of retail and residential development
An equilibrium of the retail and residential development game determines: population density,
land prices, the presence or absence of a local retailer, and shopping patterns. The model takes as
exogenous: utility levels for the alternative neighborhood, a price for the local retailer, transporta-
tion costs to local and remote retailers, and a neighborhood speciﬁc large lot bonus and wage.
Figure 1 provides a summary of equilibrium patterns of residential and retail development.
The horizontal axis in this ﬁgure gives the magnitude of w − uθ. This quantity is an immigrant’s
surplus from locating in neighborhood Y, gross of retail services and the large lot bonus. All else
2Note that the two-stage, ‘Bertrand’ operation of the land market is essential because it allows immigrants an
opportunity to respond to a landlord’s price deviations. Without such an opportunity, unilateral price changes could
not have an effect on immigrant location choices.
5equal, as we move to the right along this axis neighborhood Y becomes more attractive relative
to the next best alternative. If we think of w as the wage net of the cost of commuting from the
neighborhood to the nearest employment center then increases in w can reﬂect changes in worker
productivity or changes in commute distance. Given this, I interpret an increase in w − uθ as a
decrease in the distance from Y to an employment center.3 The vertical axis in ﬁgure 1 gives the
magnitude of the large lot bonus. All else equal, as we move vertically along this axis, a large
lot becomes more valuable in neighborhood Y. Loosely, a neighborhood is more attractive as its
distance from the origin increases.
Three patterns of retail and residential development are possible in equilibrium, vacant, low
density and high density. In a vacant equilibrium, no immigrants locate in Y. In a low density
equilibrium N immigrants locate on double lots in Y. In a high density equilibrium 2N immigrants
locate on single lots in Y. The local retailer enters if and only if the neighborhood is occupied at
high density. Land prices adjust so that immigrants are indifferent between neighborhood Y and
the alternative location θ, if neighborhood Y is not vacant.
Figure 1 divides the parameter space into ﬁve regions and describes the possible equilibria in
each region. The remainder of this section discusses ﬁgure 1 in detail and provides a complete
characterization of the equilibria.
Neighborhoods in region 1 are sufﬁciently remote from employment centers and the land is
sufﬁciently unattractive or unproductive in housing that no immigrant wants to locate in these
neighborhoods. Region 1 is described by two constraints. The ﬁrst constraint, w − tD + δ < uθ,
requires that if the local retailer does not enter then an immigrant prefers θ to a free double lot
in Y. Therefore, if the local retailer does not enter, this neighborhood cannot attract immigrants.
The left hand side of the constraint w − uθ − (tW + q) < δ gives the upper bound on the price
that an immigrant can pay to occupy a single lot in Y, shop at a local retailer and still not have
an incentive to deviate to θ. The inequality requires that this amount be less than the open space
bonus. Thus this constraint requires that, if the local retailer enters and immigrants occupy single
lots then the price of land is less than the open space premium so that immigrants will consolidate
single lots into double lots. Together these two constraints require that a neighborhood in region
1 cannot support the necessary density to make a retail ﬁrm proﬁtable and that without a retail
store the neighborhood cannot attract immigrants, even to free double lots. Since neither high
densitynorlowdensitydevelopmentisanequilibrium, aneighborhoodinregion1mustbevacant.
Proposition 1 formalizes this intuition. The proof of this proposition, and others that follow, is
presented in a technical appendix.
Proposition 1 If w − uθ − (tW + q) < δ and w − tD + δ < uθ then a pattern of retail and residential
location is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if and only if all immigrants choose θ and the local retailer
does not enter.
A neighborhood in region 2 is too far from an employment center to support dense residential
housing but the land is attractive enough that people are willing to live there on large lots and
drive to a remote retailer. Region 2 in ﬁgure 1 is described by two constraints. The constraint
3Other factors may also increase the magnitude of w − uθ. For example, an increase in the quality of local amenities.
6w − uθ − (tw + q) = δ
w − uθ − tD = δ
w − tD + δ = uθ
0
δ











Figure 1. Possible equilibrium retail and residential development patterns in different re-
gions of the parameter space.
w − tD + δ > uθ requires that neighborhood Y be attractive enough that an immigrant prefers a
free double lot in neighborhood Y to θ. Thus, Y cannot be vacant in equilibrium. The constraint
w − uθ − (tW + q) < δ is carried over from region 1. It requires that if the local retailer enters and
immigrants occupy single lots then the open space premium is large enough that immigrants have
an incentive to consolidate single lots into double lots. Thus, no residential development pattern
where the local retailer enters and immigrants occupy single lots can be an equilibrium. In all, for
a neighborhood in region 2, equilibrium requires that immigrants live on double lots and that the
local retailer not enter. Proposition 2 provides a formal statement of this result.
Proposition 2 If w−uθ −(tW +q) < δ and w+δ−tD > uθ then an outcome of the retail and residential
development game is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if N immigrants occupy double lots in Y, the
price of all lots is py = 1
2(w − uθ − tD + δ), and the local retailer does not enter.
A neighborhood in region 3 occupies land just close enough to an employment center that
immigrants are willing to live there on single lots only if a local retailer enters. However, the land
is not so attractive that a double lot can compensate immigrants for the absence of a local retailer.
Thus, immigrants are willing to live on single lots if and only if the local retailer enters and do not
occupy the neighborhood otherwise. This region of ﬁgure 1 is described by two constraints. The
constraint w−uθ +δ < tD restricts attention to neighborhoods where immigrants prefer θ to a free
7double lot when the local retailer does not enter. The second constraint, w − uθ − (tW + q) > δ,
requires that if the local retailer enters and immigrants occupy single lots then the open space
premium is not so large that immigrants have an incentive to consolidate single lots into double
lots. Thus two possible arrangements can arise in equilibrium. In the ﬁrst, neighborhood Y is
vacant and the local retailer does not enter. In the second, neighborhood Y is densely occupied
and the local retailer enters. For neighborhoods in region 3 realized development patterns hinge
on the resolution of a coordination problem. Immigrants choose single lots in the neighborhood if
and only if the local retailer enters. Otherwise the local retailer and immigrants prefer not to enter
neighborhood Y at all. Proposition 3 formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 3 If w−uθ > δ+(tW +q) and w−uθ +δ < tD then an outcome of the retail and residential
development game is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if:
1. All immigrants choose θ and the local retailer does not enter, or,
2. 2N immigrants occupy single lots in Y, py = w − uθ − (tW + q) for all y in Y, and the local retailer
enters.
A neighborhood in region 4 of ﬁgure 1 is one that is so close to an employment center that land
is too valuable for large lots to occur in equilibrium. This region of ﬁgure 1 is described by the
single constraint w − uθ − tD > δ. The left hand side of this constraint describes the most that
an immigrant would pay to occupy a single lot in Y when the local retailer does not enter. The
right hand side is the amount that an immigrant will pay for a second lot. Given this, vacant
lots will always be occupied by immigrants from θ, and an immigrant from θ has an incentive to
outbid an immigrant in Y for his second lot. Thus, the only possible equilibrium occurs when Y is
populated by immigrants on single lots. Given this, the local retailer can make a proﬁt by entering.
Proposition 4 formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 4 If w − uθ − δ > tD then an outcome of the retail and residential development game is a
subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if 2N immigrants occupy single lots in Y, py = w−uθ −(tW +q)
for all y in Y, and the local retailer enters.
Like neighborhoods in region 3, development in neighborhoods in region 5 hinges on the
resolution of a coordination problem. A neighborhood in region 5 is just close enough to an
employment center that immigrants are willing to live there on single lots only if a local retailer
enters. However, the land is attractive enough for housing that a large lot is able to compensate an
immigrant for the absence of a local retailer. Thus, immigrants are willing to live on single lots if
and only if the local retailer enters and occupy the neighborhood at low density otherwise. Region
5 of ﬁgure 1 is described by three constraints. The left hand side of the constraint w − uθ − tD < δ
describes the most that an immigrant would pay to live in neighborhood Y on a single lot without
access to a local retail store. That this amount is less than δ assures that if the local retailer does not
enter and Y is occupied by immigrants on double lots then these immigrants will not be outbid for
their second lots by immigrants from θ. The left hand side of the constraint w − uθ − (tW + q) > δ
describes the most that an immigrant on a single lot would be willing to pay to locate in Y given
8entry by a local retailer. This constraint assures that if a local retailer enters then immigrants from
θ outbid any immigrant on a double lot for their second lot. The third inequality, w − tD + δ > uθ,
states that even if the local retailer does not enter, an immigrant prefers a free double lot in Y to
θ. Altogether these constraints allow for two types of equilibria. In one the immigrants occupy
double lots and the local retailer does not enter. In the other immigrants occupy single lots and the
local retailer enters. Which of these two patterns is observed depends on how the immigrants and
the local retailer resolve their coordination problem. Proposition 5 formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 5 If w − uθ − tD < δ, w − uθ − (tW + q) > δ and w − uθ + tD > δ then an outcome of the
retail and residential development game is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if:
1. N immigrants occupy double lots in Y, py = 1
2(w − uθ − tD + δ) for all y in Y, and the local retailer
does not enter, or,
2. 2N immigrants occupy single lots in Y, py = w − uθ − (tW + q) for all y in Y, and the local retailer
enters.
In summary, this analysis shows that in much of the parameter space described by ﬁgure 1 the
model of retail and residential development behaves in familiar ways. Near the origin, the least
attractive part of the parameter space, equilibrium requires that neighborhoods be vacant. In the
region ‘due east’ of the origin, where the surplus from locating in Y is large and the large lot bonus
is small, we see only high density development. In the ‘northern’ part of the parameter space,
where the value of a second lot is large but the surplus from occupying a parcel is not otherwise
large, only low density development is possible.
Regions 3 and 5 are more interesting. In these regions more than one equilibrium outcome
is possible, one at high density and the other low density or vacant. In these regions, the real-
ized development pattern depends on which equilibrium the various economic actors coordinate
upon. The possibility of multiple equilibria has three interesting implications. First, one of these
equilibria will generally not be socially optimal. Second, the equilibria are qualitatively different
from each other. This raises the possibility that these neighborhoods may develop in a way that is
qualitatively different from the optimum. Third, this non-optimality arises in a model where none
of the usual precursors of urban sprawl are present: road congestion does not occur, infrastructure
is correctly priced, there are no distortionary taxes. Thus, if a neighborhood does manage to
coordinate on a bad equilibrium, the usual corrective taxes will not solve the problem.
Before moving on to a welfare analysis, it is of interest to consider whether the intuition gen-
erated by this model is robust to generalization of the various simplifying assumptions. Three
features of the model appear to be essential to preserving qualitatively similar results. First, the
local retailing sector cannot be too inefﬁcient relative to the remote retailing sector. If immigrants
always prefer to drive to the remote retailer, then they are never willing to forgo a large lot in
order to gain access to a local retailer and high density development cannot occur in equilibrium.
Second, the local retailer must be subject to increasing returns to scale. In the model considered
herethisassumptionismadeinitsstarkestpossibleform: thelocalretailercannotexistbelowsome
minimumscale. Thepresence of‘sufﬁcientlystrong’increasingreturnsto scaleinthelocalretailing
9sector is required if we are to have multiple equilibrium. It is not necessarily required that the
technology take the deliberately simple form used here. Third, and ﬁnally, the intuition developed
here relies on the fact that landlords are small relative to the minimum scale required to support a
local retailer. With the presence of increasing returns to scale in local retailing, immigrants impose
external beneﬁts on each other. A sufﬁciently large landlord can internalize these external beneﬁts
and capitalize them into land rents. The assumption of ‘very small’ landlords is made to simplify
the analysis. Relaxing this assumption does not appear to qualitatively affect the workings of the
model, provided that landlords remain small relative to the minimum scale of the local retailer.
On the other hand, extensions of the model to heterogenous populations and more elaborate
preferences over land come at great cost in complexity, and while they increase the realism of the
model they do not appear to lead to any further intuition about the problem.
It may also be of interest to consider variants of the game in which the timing of moves is
different. Many such sequences are possible, e.g., the local retailer makes its entry decision
before landlords choose prices, the local retailer makes its entry decision before immigrants choose
locations but after land owners choose prices, the local retailer makes its entry decision after
immigrantschooselocations. Generalstatementsabouttheimplicationsofchangestothesequence
of play for the results provided here are beyond the scope of this paper. However, preliminary
analysis suggests that allowing immigrants to move before the local retailer does not qualitatively
change the results. On the other hand, allowing the local retailer to move before the immigrants
may help to resolve the coordination problem, although it is not clear that we ought to regard this
formulationasreasonablesinceitrequiresthatthelocalretailercommittostayintheneighborhood
even if the residential location pattern assures that the retailer is not proﬁtable.
5. Optimum patterns of retail and residential development
To measure the welfare level of a given development pattern I sum rent that accrues to neighbor-
hood land, to the local retailer, and the change in rent that remote retailer experiences as a result of
location patterns in neighborhood Y. This quantity represents the most that immigrants, landown-
ers and retailers would pay, in aggregate, to have neighborhood Y opened up to immigration.
Clearly, the possibility of increasing returns to scale in the remote retailing sector is of fun-
damental importance to the welfare analysis. If the cost of remote retail services is consumed
entirely in transportation the welfare analysis is quite different than if tD consists entirely of
monopoly rent captured by the remote retailer. Likewise, if there is increasing returns to scale
in the remote retailing sector then allowing a local retailer in neighborhood Y could be harmful
to residents of other neighborhoods who are thereby deprived of less costly remote retail services.
Indeed, if the remote retailing sector is subject to ‘strong enough’ increasing returns to scale, dense
neighborhoods with local retail are never optimal.
With this said, examining the implications of different sorts of technological structures for the
optimal citywide portfolio of local and remote retailing is beyond the scope of the current analysis.
Therefore, I consider particularly simple local and remote retailing technologies in order to abstract
from these issues.
10In particular, assume that tD consists entirely of transportation costs. Implicitly, this assumption
also requires that the remote retailer produces retail services at zero marginal cost, and that the
remote retailer operates in a competitive environment. Furthermore, recall that I earlier speciﬁed
a very simple local retail technology: after paying his ﬁxed cost to locate in Y the local retailer
produces retail services at zero marginal cost. Thus, q is a pure monopoly rent and tW is pure travel
costs. Given these assumptions, monopoly rents for the remote retailer are zero, while monopoly
rents for the local retailer are nq − F if the local retailer enters and zero otherwise.
For a given pattern of development, let NH denote the number of immigrants locating in Y on
single lots and let NL denote the number of immigrants locating in Y on double lots. The planner’s
problem is to arrange immigrants across single lots, double lots, and θ, and to choose whether or
not the local retailer enters, so as to maximize the sum of land rents and rent for the local retailer.
To begin, consider a constrained version of this problem where the local retailer cannot enter.
The land rent generated by a particular parcel is the most that an immigrant would pay for the
opportunity to locate on that parcel. That is, w − uθ adjusted by the cost of retail services and
possibly an open space bonus. Let WD denote aggregate land rent when the local retailer does not
enter and all immigrants drive to a remote retailer. Recalling there are M immigrants in total, the
planner’s constrained maximization problem is given by,
W∗
D = maxNH,NL NH(w − uθ − tD) + NL(w − uθ − tD + δ) + Muθ
s.t. NH + 2NL ≤ 2N
NH,NL ≥ 0.
To solve this problem, note that the objective function is linear in the choice variables. Thus, in
general, only one type of land use will occur in any optimum, high density, low density, or vacant.
Which of these three uses is optimal is determined by the magnitudes of the objective when all land






Muθ if w − uθ − tD < −δ
N(w − uθ − tD + δ) + Muθ if − δ < w − uθ − tD < δ
2N(w − uθ − tD) + Muθ if δ < w − uθ − tD.
In words, from the top of the parenthetical list to the bottom, when the local retailer does not enter
constrained optimality requires that: Y be vacant when w − uθ − tD < −δ, that Y be occupied
entirely at low density when −δ < w − uθ − tD < δ, that 2N immigrants occupy Y at high density
when w − uθ − tD > δ. Figure 2 illustrates this solution and shows that optimizing behavior is
intuitive. When w − uθ and δ are small Y is vacant. When w − uθ is larger and the large lot bonus
is still small then Y is occupied at high density. When the large lot bonus is large Y is occupied at
low density.
We can also solve the corresponding constrained optimization when the local retailer must
enter. Let WW denote aggregate land rent when the local retailer does enter and all immigrants
walk to a local retailer. Then the planner’s constrained maximization problem is given by,
11w − uθ − δ = tD









Figure 2. Socially optimal types of residential development given that the local retailer is
constrained not to enter.
W∗
W = max NH(w − uθ − tW) + NL(w − uθ − tW + δ) − F + Muθ
s.t. NH + 2NL ≤ 2N
NH,NL ≥ 0.
The form of this problem is the same as when the local retailer is constrained not to enter. By a






Muθ − F if w − uθ − tW < −δ
N(w − uθ − tW + δ) + Muθ − F if − δ < w − uθ − tW < δ
2N(w − uθ − tW) + Muθ − F if δ < w − uθ − tW.
In words, from the top of the parenthetical list to the bottom, when the local retailer enters
constrained optimality requires that: Y be vacant when w − uθ − tW < −δ, that Y be occupied
entirely at low density when −δ < w − uθ − tW < δ, that 2N immigrants occupy Y at high density
when w − uθ − tW > δ. While optimizing behavior when the local retailer enters is qualitatively
similar to optimizing behavior when the local retailer does not enter, two features of this optimum
deserve comment. First, the price of retail services at the local retailer, q, does not appear in W∗
W.
12w − uθ = δ + (2tW + F
N − tD)










Figure 3. Socially optimal patterns of residential development.
Since the marginal cost of local retail services is zero, q is just a transfer from immigrants to the
local retailer and does not affect welfare. Second, the choice of density at which to develop Y does
not depend on F. When the local retailer is constrained to enter F is a sunk cost which does not
respond to these decisions.
To arrive at a solution to the unconstrained planner’s problem, that is, the rent maximizing
arrangement of immigrants and retailers, we must choose W∗ = max{W∗
W,W∗
D}. To proceed, ﬁrst
note that it is never optimal for the local retailer to enter when Y is vacant. Second, while it can
never occur in equilibrium, it may be that the optimum is for Y to be occupied at low density when
the local retail ﬁrm enters. For now, impose the parametric restriction, NtW + F > NtD, so that
low density development with a local retailer is always dominated by low density development
without a local retailer. Having eliminated vacant and low density neighborhoods with a local
retailer as candidate optima, solving for W∗ now requires only that I compare W∗
D with 2N(w −
uθ − tW) + Muθ − F, the rent obtained with high density occupation of Y and entry by the local
retailer.
13Performing this comparison I calculate the maximum possible welfare as,
W∗ =

         
         
Muθ if w − uθ + δ < tD
and w − uθ < tW + F
2N
N(w − uθ − tD + δ) + Muθ if w − uθ + δ > tD
and w − uθ − δ < (2tW + F
N − tD)
2N(w − uθ − tW) + Muθ − F if w − uθ − δ > (2tW + F
N − tD)
and w − uθ > tW + F
2N.
From the top of the parenthetical list to the bottom, optimality requires that Y be vacant and the
local retailer not enter, that Y be occupied at low density and the local retailer not enter, and that Y
be occupied at high density and the local retailer enter. Figure 3 summarizes this result.
Comparing the unconstrained optimum of ﬁgure 3 with the constrained optimum of ﬁgure 2
shows that the difference between unconstrained and constrained optimization is intuitive. In the
unconstrained optimum, the region of the parameter space where high density development oc-
curs is unambiguously larger and encroaches on parts of the parameter space where the restricted
optimal development pattern is low density or vacant.
This analysis so far has been based on a the parametric restriction NtW + F > NtD. The analysis
is identical if we relax this assumption and simply prohibit the choice of low density development
with entry by a local retailer. Since a local retailer will require a subsidy in a low density neighbor-
hood this restriction converts our problem into the second best optimization problem in which the
planner is prohibited from subsidizing the local retailer.
If we consider the complementary parameter restriction, NtW + F < NtD, then low density
development with entry by the local retailer dominates low density development without entry by
the local retailer. In this case, the ﬁgure corresponding to ﬁgure 3 changes only in that a portion of
the parameter space where Y is optimally vacant in ﬁgure 3 switches to low density development
with local retail and the region of ﬁgure 3 given over to low density development without a local
retailer switches to low density development with a local retailer.
6. Optimal vs. equilibrium patterns of development
There are three reasons why the equilibrium pattern of development differs from the optimum.
First, in equilibrium immigrants respond to the market price of local retail services, tW + q. This is
differentfromthesocialpriceoftheseservices, whichis tW forthemarginalimmigrantand tW + F
2N
on average (given high density development). Second, when an immigrant decides whether to buy
a second lot he does so purely on the basis of the difference between the value of a second parcel
and the price of the parcel. He does not consider whether this decision will make a local retailer
unproﬁtable. In effect, an immigrant who purchases a second lot is free riding on the fact that
other immigrants facilitate the entry of the local retailer by living on single rather than double lots.
Third, in some regions of the parameter space the choice of development pattern depends on the
way that immigrants and the local retailer resolve a coordination problem. In these regions of the
parameter space immigrants are willing to live at high density if and only if the local retailer enters.
14w − uθ = δ + (2tW + F
N − tD)
w − uθ − (tw + q) = δ
w − uθ − tD = δ











Figure 4. Shaded areas indicate regions of the parameter space where equilibrium and optimal
patterns of retail and residential development diverge.
Figure 4 compares results presented by ﬁgures 1 and 3 to illustrate the differences between
optimal and equilibrium patterns of development. Equilibrium and optimal development diverge
in each of the four shaded regions of the graph and are identical in the white areas. In each of
regions I—IV optimality requires high density development and entry by the local retailer. In
equilibrium region I is vacant, region II is developed at low density without a local retailer, region
III is either vacant or developed at high density with a local retailer, region IV is developed at low
density without a local retailer or at high density with a local retailer.
In regions III and IV divergence between the equilibrium and the optimum is not certain. In
these regions there are multiple equilibria and agents may coordinate on optimal or sub-optimal
equilibria. Interestingly, in this context it makes sense to talk about high density development with
a local retail sector as being ’smart’ and low density car based development as ‘sprawl’. Smart
development patterns are those that result from a welfare maximizing resolution of the coordin-
ation problem. Sprawling development results from a sub-optimal resolution of the coordination
problem.
The discussion so far has investigated the conditions under which equilibrium development
is less dense than optimal development. It is also of interest to investigate the magnitude of the
welfare loss associated with this divergence. Suppose that low density development is observed
15for a neighborhood which lies in regions II or IV, where high density development is optimal. The
rent generated by such a neighborhood is simply,
WL = 2Npy,
the sum of payments collected by landowners. The rent generated by the corresponding unob-
served high density neighborhood is,
WH = 2N(w − uθ − tW) − F.
If we recall from propositions 2 and 5 that in a low density equilibrium py = 1
2(w − uθ − tD + δ)
then it follows that WH − WL is increasing in w − uθ for ﬁxed δ. Thus, in ﬁgure 4, for given δ,
WH −WL is largest at the eastern boundary of region IV, where w − uθ = δ + tD, i.e., at the largest
value of w − uθ where low density can occur in equilibrium when high density is optimal. A little
algebra shows that at this boundary, py = 0, so
WH −WL = WH
= 2N(w − uθ − tW) − F
= 2N(δ + tD − tW) − F
> 2Nδ + Nq − F.
where the last line follows from the assumption that tW + q < tD. In sum, the welfare loss from
inefﬁcient low density development can be larger than number of parcels in the neighborhood
multiplied by the open space bonus, plus the proﬁts of the local retailer. Since people often appear
to assign a high value to a larger yard, in principal, this could be a large quantity. Thus, it is
probable that the inefﬁciency studied here is economically important in some neighborhoods.
There are a number of possible solutions to the inefﬁciencies identiﬁed here. The creation
of land owners who are large relative to Y, or the presence of local zoning authorities whose
jurisdictions are large relative to Y can insure that the coordination problem is resolved optimally.
A tax on large lots can also be effective. If the purchase of second parcels is taxed just highly
enough that immigrants wishing to consolidate single lots into double lots ﬁnd it uneconomic to
do so, then in both regions III and IV, the only equilibrium which survives is one in which the
neighborhood is settled at high density and the local retailer enters.
A free rider problem emerges in regions I and II. Given the presence of a local retailer, the
value of single lot to an immigrant is less than the value of a second lot. Thus, given a local retailer
immigrants prefer to locate inY at high density to θ. However, given a local retailer they also prefer
to occupy a double lot to a single lot, so that immigrants occupying single lots are displaced by
immigrants occupying double lots. Put another way, immigrants buying double lots free ride on
the fact that other immigrants facilitate the entry of the local retailer by living on single rather than
double lots. The policy responses to this are the same as for other public goods problems. Either
tax ‘bad’ behavior, or subsidize ‘good’ behavior. In this case, this means taxing the acquisition of a
second parcel, or subsidizing immigrants on single lots.
A third problem also contributes to the divergence between optimum and equilibrium in re-
gions I and II. In equilibrium immigrants make their location decisions on the basis the full retail
16price of retail services, tW + q. The optimal development pattern is determined by the magnitude
of the ﬁxed cost and the difference between travel costs to local and remote retailers, but not q.
Inspection of ﬁgure 4 shows that if q decreases to F
2N then the size of regions I and II also decreases.
A subsidy for the purchase of local retail services also appears to resolve this problem. Alternately,
the condition q = F
2N is the zero proﬁt condition for the local retailer, a possible outcome for some
models of monopoly pricing. Thus, this problem will not emerge under market structures that
insure that the local retailer collects no monopoly rent.
It is tempting to contemplate restrictions on the scale or presence of remote retailing as a
possible solution to possible gap between equilibrium and optimum development. However,
on the basis of the current analysis it is not possible to argue for or against such restriction. In
particular, the optimality of this strategy will depend crucially on the extent of returns to scale in
the local and remote retail sectors, an issue that the current analysis deliberately ignores. With this
said, it is clear that restrictions on remote retailing are at best an indirect solution to the possibility
of inefﬁciently low residential densities. A tax on large lots or a subsidy for small lots addresses
the problem much more directly.
7. An empirical test for efﬁciency
Giventhatvacantandlowdensitydevelopmentcanbeeitheroptimalorsuboptimal, itisofinterest
to be able to distinguish optimal from suboptimal residential development.
By inspection of ﬁgure 4 inefﬁciently low densities can occur in regions II and IV. In these
regions the following two inequalities hold,





w − uθ + δ > tD.
Conditional on observing low density development, from propositions 3 and 5, we have that the
price of a parcel in these regions is py = 1
2(w − uθ − tD + δ). A little algebra allows us to rewrite
the two equations above in terms of this observed price of a parcel,






In words, if we observe low density development then this development is inefﬁcient if the price
of a parcel is less than δ, but larger than δ minus the difference between the cost of providing retail
services remotely rather than locally.
Similarly, inspection of ﬁgure 4 shows that inefﬁciently vacant land can occur in regions I and
III. In these regions the following inequality holds,
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Figure 5. Probability density function of population density across areas of different in-
tensity of development.
That is, a parcel that is vacant in equilibrium is optimally developed as high density housing if
immigrants can locate in the neighborhood in question, shop locally, and still be better off than
they would be in the alternative city.
While each of these inequalities is clearly difﬁcult to estimate empirically, all of the quantities
involved are, at least in principal, subject to observation. Thus, it should be possible to distinguish
inefﬁcient low density development from efﬁcient low density development.
8. Some suggestive empirical evidence
One of the predictions of the model developed here is that there will be two types of neighbor-
hoods, those populated at high densities and those populated at low densities. Neighborhoods
with intermediate densities cannot occur in equilibrium.
Figure 5, which is based on the analysis and data in Burchﬁeld et al. (5), presents some evidence
consistent with this prediction. The ﬁgure is based on a map of the continental US derived from
1992 satellite imagery. Burchﬁeld et al. (5) overlay the whole of the continental US with a regular
grid whose cells are approximately one kilometer square. For each such cell they calculate the
share of its area which, according to the satellite, is in residential use. The horizontal axis of ﬁgure
5 describes the share of such a grid cell that is in residential use. The vertical axis gives the share
of US population from the 1990 US census. The solid line in the ﬁgure is a p.d.f. describing the
distribution of population across regions which are developed at different densities.
We see that this p.d.f. is bimodal. People are relatively more likely to live in low density or
high density neighborhoods. People are less likely to live at intermediate densities. While other
possible explanations for this ﬁnding are possible, e.g., Harrison and Kain (9), this graph is clearly
18consistent with the predictions of the game of residential and retail development analyzed here:
neighborhoods tend to be occupied at high densities or low densities, not at intermediate densities.
9. Conclusions
The results of this analysis are as follows. Only three residential development patterns are possible
in equilibrium, ‘vacant’, ‘high density with a local retailer’ and ‘low density without a local re-
tailer’. Intermediate types of neighborhood cannot occur in equilibrium. There is some suggestive
empirical evidence in support of this conclusion.
The types of neighborhoods in which these different patterns occur are intuitive. Vacant land
occurs in unattractive places. Low density development occurs where the large lot bonus is large
relative to the other components of the value of the land. High density development with a local
retailer occurs where the large lot bonus is not large relative to the other component of land value,
and this other component is itself large. Interestingly, for intermediate parameter values multiple
equilibria are possible: immigrants will occupy a neighborhood at high density if and only if a
local retailer also enters.
A normative analysis of this model shows that equilibrium and optimal patterns of develop-
ment do not always coincide and, when they diverge, optimal development is always at a higher
density than equilibrium development. There are three reasons for this divergence. First, in parts
oftheparameterspacewheremultipleequilibriaarepossible, immigrantsmayfailtocoordinateon
the socially optimal equilibrium. Second, residential location choices may be subject to a free rider
problem. This problem arises when immigrants consolidate single lots into double lots without
regard for the fact that this action may make the local retailer unproﬁtable. Third, immigrants
respond to the market price of local retail services rather than the social price. If the local retailer
is able to exercise monopoly power to price retail services above their average cost, this can cause
immigrants to not occupy a neighborhood at high density when this is optimal.
In every case, the divergence between optimal and equilibrium development is driven by
immigrants who have an incentive consolidate single lots into double lots when it is optimal to
occupy single lots. Thus, the policy response to these problems is clear. The planner should tax
the acquisition of large lots or subsidize people who live on small lots. Alternately, the presence
landowners or zoning authorities that are large relative to a neighborhood should also be effective.
It is interesting to note that the divergence between optimal and equilibrium development does
not arise from the factors usually listed as precursors to urban sprawl, e.g., failure to price roads
or infrastructure correctly. Indeed, in the model I have analyzed, private and social transportation
costs coincide and there are no marginal costs of infrastructure. Clearly, if transportation and
infrastructure are not correctly priced this will exacerbate other inefﬁciencies that arise in this
model.
It is worthwhile to note that the model of retail and residential development analyzed here may
also be useful in the analysis of local public goods for which there are increasing returns to scale,
e.g., schools, police stations, parks. The principal difference between the problem of retail location
19and the problem of public good location is that retail services are ﬁnanced by market transactions,
while local public goods are ﬁnanced by taxes.
Curiously, this analysis seems to conﬁrm the view taken by both urban economists and by anti-
sprawl activists. This model clearly indicates the possibility for equilibrium development patterns
that are more than marginally different from the optimum. However, these fundamentally wrong
development patterns can be avoided with a change in marginal incentives, a tax on the acquisition
of large lots. With this said, this tax is not one that economists have considered previously.
Finally, it is worthwhile to contrast the results obtained here with those obtained in Turner (16).
In this earlier paper I examine the way that residential land is organized when individuals have
a taste for nearby public open space. In this environment a competitive equilibrium is ‘too dense’
becauseinamarketequilibriumindividualsdonotaccountfortheharmtheycausetheirneighbors
by occupying open spaces. The policy response to this problem requires regulation to preserve
open space in certain regions of a city. Loosely, the current paper considers the implications of
increasing returns to population density in an environment where individuals derive utility from
large private land holdings and ﬁnds that competitive equilibrium under provides density. Both
effects are probably at work in reality and combining the two results suggests that equilibrium
cities will tend to have too little public open space, too much private land and too few shops near
residential neighborhoods.
Appendix: Proofs:
Proposition 1 If w − uθ − (tW + q) < δ and w − tD + δ < uθ then a pattern of retail and residential
location is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if and only if all immigrants choose θ and the local retailer
does not enter.
Proof: (Necessity) Suppose the local retailer enters and N0 < F
q immigrants locate in Y. Then the
local retailer’s proﬁts are π = N0q − F. This is less than zero by hypothesis, so the local retailer
exits. Supposethelocalretailerentersand N00 ≥ F
q. Since F
q islargerthat N, atleasttwoimmigrants
must occupy single lots, say j and j0. In equilibrium uj = w − pyj − (tW + q) ≥ uθ or j deviates to
θ. This implies that pyj ≤ w − uθ − (tW + q). If landlord yj deviates to p0
yj ∈ (w − uθ − (tW + q),δ)
then, in the second stage location game, immigrant j can deviate to θ and j0 is better off deviating
to yj for a change in payoff ∆uj0 = δ− p0
yj > 0. Thus there is no equilibrium where the local retailer
enters.
Suppose the local retailer does not enter and some immigrant j locates in Y. Then uj ≤ w−tD +
δ. But by hypothesis this is less than uθ. Thus there is no equilibrium where the local retailer does
not enter and any immigrants locate in Y.
(Sufﬁciency) Say all immigrants choose θ and the local retailer does not enter. If the local retailer
deviates and enters then its proﬁts are −F instead of zero. If immigrant j deviates to Y then uj ≤
w − tD + δ. This is less than uθ by hypothesis.

20Proposition 2 If w−uθ −(tW +q) < δ and w+δ−tD > uθ then an outcome of the retail and residential
development game is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if N immigrants occupy double lots in Y, the
price of all lots is py = 1
2(w − uθ − tD + δ), and the local retailer does not enter.
(Necessity) Say local retailer enters and N0 < F
q immigrants locate in Y. Then π ≤ N0q − F < 0
so the local retailer exits. Suppose the local retailer enters and N00 ≥ F
q immigrants locate in
Y. Since F
q > N at least two immigrants , say j and j0, occupy single lots. It follows that uj =
w − pyj − (tW + q) ≥ uθ so that pyj ≤ w − uθ − (tW + q). This is less than δ by hypothesis. If
landlord yj deviates to p0
yj ∈ (w − uθ − (tW + q),δ) then in the second stage location game j is
better off deviating to θ and j0 occupies yj as a second lot for a change in utility, ∆uj0 = δ − p0
yj > 0.
Thus there is no equilibrium in which the local retailer enters.
Suppose the local retailer does not enter. If some immigrant j occupies a single lot in equi-
librium, then uj = w − tD − pyj ≥ uθ. This implies that w − td − uθ ≥ pyj. Since kYk is even,
either there is another immigrant j0 occupying a single lot in Y, or there is a vacant lot in Y. Since
vacant lots are assumed to have price zero in any equilibrium, if there is a vacant lot, then j can
deviate to occupy it for a change in utility δ. If there is another immigrant j0 occupying a single
lot. Then, if landlord yj deviates to p0
yj ∈ (w − uθ − (tW + q),δ), in the second stage location game,
immigrant j is better off deviating to θ and j0 is better off occupying yj as a second lot. Thus there is
no equilibrium where the local retailer does not enter and an immigrant occupies a just one parcel.
Suppose the local retailer does not enter and there is an unoccupied parcel y in Y. Since no
immigrant occupies a single lot and kYk is even, there must be a second vacant parcel y0. By
assumption py = py0 = 0, so if immigrant j deviates from θ to occupy {y , y0} then uj = w − tD +
δ > uθ. Thus, the only possible equilibrium occurs when the local retailer does not enter and N
immigrants occupy double lots in Y.
Suppose N immigrants occupy double lots in Y and the local retailer does not enter. Then for
each immigrant we must have uj = w − (pyj + py0
j) − tD + δ = uθ. If uj < uθ then j deviates to θ. If
uj > uθ then landlord yj can deviate to a higher price without creating an incentive for immigrant
j to deviate. It follows that, for each j the price of at least one of his two lots, say yj, satisﬁes
pyj ≥ 1
2(w − uθ − tD + δ). Suppose that for some j0, py0
j0 < 1
2(w − uθ − tD + δ). Then landlord y0
j0




2(w − uθ − tD + δ)). This deviation causes immigrant j0 to deviate to θ
in the second stage location game, and any of the other N − 1 immigrants in Y to exchange their
high priced lot for y0
j0. Thus the only possible equilibrium occurs when the local retailer does not
enter, N immigrants occupy double lots in Y, and py = 1
2(w − uθ − tD + δ) for all y in Y.
(Sufﬁcient) Say the local retailer does not enter, N immigrants occupy double lots in Y, and py =
1
2(w − uθ − tD + δ) for all y in Y. If the local retailer enters then its proﬁts decrease to Nq − F < 0,
from 0. All immigrants are indifferent between their double lot and deviating to θ. An immigrant
j deviating to a single lot experiences a change in utility ∆uj = py − δ = 1
2(w − uθ − tD + δ) − δ.
Since w − uθ − tD < w − uθ − (tW + q) which is less than δ by hypothesis, it follows that ∆uj < 0.
Landlords cannot rationally deviate to a lower price, and deviating to a higher price creates an
incentive for their occupying immigrant to deviate to θ, not to be replaced.

21Proposition 3 If w−uθ > δ+(tW +q) and w−uθ +δ < tD then an outcome of the retail and residential
development game is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if:
1. All immigrants choose θ and the local retailer does not enter, or,
2. 2N immigrants occupy single lots in Y, py = w − uθ − (tW + q) for all y in Y, and the local retailer
enters.
Proof: (Necessity[1]) Say the local retailer does not enter and some immigrant occupies a location
in Y. Then uj ≤ w − tD + δ. Therefore, by hypothesis, uj < uθ, so immigrant j deviates to θ. Thus,
if the local retailer does not enter, there is no equilibrium where immigrants locate in Y.
(Sufﬁciency[1]) Say the local retailer does not enter and all immigrants choose θ. If the local
retailer deviates and enters its proﬁts decrease to −F from 0. If an immigrant j deviates and locates
in Y then uj ≤ w − tD + δ, which is less than uθ by hypothesis.
(Necessity[2]) Say the local retailer enters and a lot y in Y is vacant. Then immigrant j can
deviate from θ to y for a payoff uj = w − (tW + q) which is greater than uθ since w − (tW + q) >
uθ + δ by hypothesis. Thus no lot in Y is vacant. Say the local retailer enters and some immigrant
j occupies a double lot {yj , y0
j}. Then pyj and py0
j ≤ δ or j deviates to a single lot. By hypothesis,
(δ,w − uθ − (tW + q)) is not empty. Thus landlord yj can deviate to p0
yj ∈ (δ,w − uθ − (tW + q)).
In the second stage location game, immigrant j responds by deviating to a single lot y0
j or θ, and
some immigrant j0 can deviate from θ to yj for a payoff uj0 = w − p0
yj − (tW + q) > uθ. Thus, any
equilibrium where the local retailer enters equilibrium requires that 2N immigrants occupy single
lots in Y.
Suppose the local retailer enters and 2N immigrants occupy single lots in Y. Say py < w − uθ −
(tW + q) for some yj. Then landlord yj can increase pyj without giving j an incentive to deviate.
Conversely, if py > w − uθ − (tW + q), then uj < uθ and j deviates to θ.
(Sufﬁciency[2]) Say the local retailer enters, 2N immigrants occupy Y, and py = w− uθ −(tW +
q) for all y in Y. If the local retailer exits then its proﬁts decrease to zero from 2Nq − F > 0.
Immigrants are indifferent between their double lot in Y and θ. Deviating to a single lot results in
a change in payoff of δ− py = δ−(w−uθ −(tW +q)) which is negative by hypothesis. Landlords
are worse off lowering prices, and insure that their parcel is less attractive than θ by raising them.
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Proposition 4 If w − uθ − δ > tD then an outcome of the retail and residential development game is a
subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if 2N immigrants occupy single lots in Y, py = w−uθ −(tW +q)
for all y in Y, and the local retailer enters.
Proof: (Necessity) Say the local retailer does not enter and y in Y is vacant. Some immigrant j can
deviate from θ to y for a payoff of uj = w − tD. Since w − uθ − δ > tD by hypothesis, w − tD > uθ
follows. Thus there are no vacant parcels in Y in any equilibrium when the local retailer does not
enter.
Say the local retailer does not enter and 2N immigrants locate on single lots in Y. Then the local
retailer can enter and increase its proﬁts. Thus, in any equilibrium where the local retailer does
22not enter, all lots in Y must be occupied, and some immigrant j in Y must occupy a double lot, say
{yj , y0
j}. It follows that pyj and py0
j ≤ δ or j deviates to a single lot. By hypothesis (δ,w − uθ − δ)
is not empty. Thus landlord yj can deviate to p0
yj ∈ (δ,w − uθ − tD). In the second stage location
game, immigrant j is better off deviating from {yj ,y0
j} to θ, and some immigrant j0 deviates from
θ to yj for a payoff uj0 = w − p0
yj − tD > uθ. Thus, if the local retailer does not enter, Y contains no
vacant parcels in equilibrium.
Say the local retailer enters and some lot in Y is vacant. Then j can deviate from θ to y for
payoff uj = w − (tW + q). Since w − (tW + q) > w − tD > w − tD − δ > uθ, this deviation is
rational. Say the local retailer enters and some immigrant j occupies a double lot {yj , y0
j}. Then
pyj and py0
j ≤ δ or j deviates to a single lot. By hypothesis, (δ,w − uθ − tD) is not empty. Thus
landlord yj can deviate to p0
yj ∈ (δ,w − uθ − tD). In the second stage location game, immigrant
j is better off deviating to θ, and some immigrant j0 rationally deviates from θ to yj for a payoff
uj0 = w − p0
yj − tD > uθ.
Now say 2N immigrants occupy single lots in Y, the local retailer enters, and py < w − uθ −
(tW + q) for some yj. Then landlord yj can increase pyj without giving j an incentive to deviate.
Conversely, if py > w − uθ − (tW + q), then uj < uθ and j deviates to θ.
(Sufﬁciency) Say the local retailer enters, 2N immigrants occupy single lots in Y, and
py = w − uθ − (tW + q) for all y in Y. If the local retailer exits it proﬁts decrease to zero
from 2Nq − F > 0. Immigrants are indifferent between their single lots in Y and θ. Landlords
are worse off lowering prices, and insure that their parcel is less attractive than θ by raising them.
Proposition 5 If w − uθ − tD < δ, w − uθ − (tW + q) > δ and w − uθ + tD > δ then an outcome of the
retail and residential development game is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if:
1. N immigrants occupy double lots in Y, py = 1
2(w − uθ − tD + δ) for all y in Y, and the local retailer
does not enter, or,
2. 2N immigrants occupy single lots in Y, py = w − uθ − (tW + q) for all y in Y, and the local retailer
enters.
Proof: (Necessity[1]) Say the local retailer does not enter and some immigrant j occupies a single
lot y in Y. Then uj = w− pyj − tD ≥ uθ which implies that pyj ≤ w− uθ − tD. Thus, by hypothesis,
py < δ. Since kYk even, if immigrant j occupies a single lot then either there is another vacant lot or
another immigrant j0 occupies a single lot in Y. If landlord yj deviates to p0
yj ∈ (w−uθ −tD,δ) then
immigrant j deviatesto θ and, either, immigrant j0 occupies yj asasecondlot, oranimmigrantfrom
θ occupies yj and the vacant lot. Thus, if the local retailer does not enter, no immigrant occupies a
single lot in Y.
Say the local retailer does not enter and some lot in Y is vacant. Since no immigrant occupies a
single lot and kYk is even, there must be two vacant lots {y, y0} in Y. If immigrant j deviates from
θ to {y , y0} then uj = w − tD + δ which is greater than uθ by hypothesis. Thus any equilibrium of
the retail and residential development game in which the local retailer does not enter, must have
N immigrants occupying double lots in Y.
23Suppose N immigrants occupy double lots in Y and the local retailer does not enter. Then for
each immigrant we must have uj = w − (pyj + py0
j) − tD + δ = uθ. If uj < uθ then j deviates to θ. If
uj > uθ then landlord yj can deviate to a higher price without creating an incentive for immigrant
j to deviate. It follows that for each j the price of at least one of their two lots, say yj, satisﬁes
pyj ≥ 1
2(w − uθ − tD + δ). Suppose that for some j0, py0
j0 < 1
2(w − uθ − tD + δ). Then landlord y0
j0




2(w − uθ − tD + δ)). This deviation causes immigrant j to deviate to θ in
the second stage location game, and any of the other N −1 immigrants in Y to exchange their high
priced lot for y0
j. Thus the only possible equilibrium occurs when the local retailer does not enter,
N immigrants occupy double lots in Y, and py = 1
2(w − uθ − tD + δ) for all y in Y.
(Sufﬁciency[1]) Say the local retailer does not enter, N immigrants occupy double lots in Y, and
py = 1
2(w − uθ − tD + δ) for all y in Y. If the local retailer enters its proﬁts decrease to Nq − F < 0,
from 0. All immigrants are indifferent between their double lot and deviating to θ. An immigrant
j deviating to a single lot experiences a change in utility ∆uj = py − δ = 1
2(w − uθ − tD + δ) − δ.
Since w − uθ − tD < δ by hypothesis, it follows that ∆uj < 0. Landlords cannot rationally deviate
to a lower price, and deviating to a higher price creates an incentive for their occupying immigrant
to deviate to θ, not to be replaced.
(Necessity[2]) Say the local retailer enters and some location y in Y is vacant. Then immigrant j
can deviate from θ to y for a payoff uj = w − (tW + q). Since w − (tW + q) − δ > uθ by hypothesis,
it follows that uj > uθ. Say the local retailer enters and some immigrant occupies a double lot
{yj , y0
j}. It follows that pyj and py0
j ≤ δ or j deviates to a single lot. If landlord yj deviates
to p0
yj ∈ (δ,w − uθ − (tW + q)) then in the second stage location game, immigrant j is better off
deviating from {yj , y0
j} to θ, and some immigrant i deviates from θ to yj for a payoff ui = w −
(tW + q) − p0
yj > uθ. Thus in any equilibrium where the local retailer enters, 2N immigrants must
occupy single lots in Y.

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